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crisis and other persistent media policy challenges, this analysis of market failure holds much
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Social Democracy or Corporate Libertarianism?
Conflicting Media Policy Narratives in the Wake of
Market Failure
Victor Pickard
The Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA

Assuming that crucial public services should not be left entirely to market-driven forces, American policymakers
attempted to establish safeguards for news media. An examination of conflicting narratives within postwar policy
debates suggests that the US evaded this path largely because of a concerted backlash—often in the form of redbaiting—encouraged by threatened newspaper and broadcast industries. Many lessons, parallels, and forgotten
antecedents for current American media policy can be drawn from the postwar 1940s. Thus, it is instructive to
explore how these earlier debates were framed, particularly in response to what might be referred to as ‘‘market
failure.’’ Given the worsening journalism crisis and other persistent media policy challenges, this analysis of
market failure holds much contemporary relevance.

Postwar America saw the brief ascendance of a social democratic approach to media. In response to a journalism
crisis with some similarities to the one that the United States and many other countries are facing today,
progressive policymakers sought to lessen profit pressures on key parts of the news media. They argued that
crucial public services should not be left entirely to market-driven forces, and attempted to establish safeguards
to protect and sustain news media. An examination of the conflicting narratives within postwar policy debates
suggests this approach was rejected largely because of a concerted backlash—often in the form of red-baiting—
encouraged by the newspaper and broadcast industries. The path the United States chose instead was based
largely on a top-down corporate consensus rather than—as some Americans might assume today—a citizen
uprising against governmental overreach.
Many of the conditions that gave rise to the contemporary journalism crisis can be traced back to policy
debates in the 1930s (McChesney, 1993) and postwar 1940s (Pickard, 2010a). The 1940s in particular held many
parallels to and lessons for current media-related challenges. Thus, it is instructive to explore how these earlier
debates were framed, and what ideological narratives different constituencies relied on to reach specific policy
positions. The following analysis draws from archival materials to shed light on the formation of the corporate
libertarian paradigm that continues to orient U.S. media policy today. By focusing on the discursive tactics
deployed by commercial broadcasters in the postwar era to defeat the regulatory threat of a muscular public
interest mandate, we can better understand contemporary policy discourses that continue to mask the effects of
systemic market failure.
The main objective in this article, therefore, is to understand the normative foundations of competing
policy narratives that have important antecedents in the postwar 1940s. To tease out these underlying
assumptions—beliefs that are often primarily ideological—I first explore the concept of market failure within
the American media system, especially as it relates to the contemporary journalism crisis. Second, I show how
narratives based on what I refer to as ‘‘corporate libertarian’’ ideology help manage and mask this systemic
failure. Third, I focus on narratives within postwar media policy debates that highlight the conflicting logics of
the corporate libertarian ideology compared to a more social democratic approach. Finally, I apply these
theoretical formulations to current media policy debates, particularly those relating to the future of journalism.
Journalism crisis = market failure

Market fundamentalism, or what I term ‘‘corporate libertarianism,’’ remains the dominant paradigm in U.S.
media policymaking. The logic of corporate libertarianism, as I explain in more detail below, assumes that the
market is the most efficient and therefore the most socially desirable means for allocating important resources.
However, assessing the current U.S. journalism crisis—as well as other social problems like the persistent digital
divide—arguably challenges corporate libertarianism on its own terms. By closely scrutinizing the assumption
that the American media system is the product of a ‘‘free market,’’ or that it maximizes efficiency, we can bring
into focus how a structural problem like the journalism crisis qualifies as a case of ‘‘market failure.’’ Market

failure, a concept drawn from mainstream neoclassical economic thought and explicated by various economists
(see, e.g., Bator, 1958; Stiglitz, 1989; Medema, 2007), typically refers to a predicament where the market is
unable to efficiently allocate resources, especially public goods. Often this occurs when private enterprise will
not invest in critical social services because it cannot extract the profits that would justify necessary expenditures.
Market failure has been cited as a justification for state intervention in the provision of public education and
other social services and goods not supported by market transactions.
Evidence of market failure in the U.S. media system continues to accumulate, especially after long-term
disinvestment in news production. The recent demise of the New Orleans Times-Picayune—which reduced staff
by nearly a third and delivery to thrice-weekly in a city where 36% of residents lack internet connection—serves
as a stark example of market failure and its negative impact on local communities. Whether as a description of
the market’s inability to support journalism or its deficiencies in providing universal access to affordable and
reliable internet services, the phrase ‘‘market failure’’ arguably deserves central prominence in American media
policy discourse. Yet a discussion of market failure, particularly how it figures in the journalism crisis, has been
noticeably missing. This absence has been largely evident even in critical scholars’ research—a consequence,
perhaps, of the concept’s neoclassical origins. But to advance the case for public policy intervention, especially
within American policymaking circles where market fundamentalism still reigns, recognizing and correcting
market failure is an essential task.
Related to this project is the recognition that our informational infrastructure is something more than a
simple commodity. In recent years, a number of scholars have argued that the information produced by
journalism should be treated as a public good (Hamilton, 2006; Pickard, Stearns & Aaron, 2009; McChesney &
Nichols, 2010; Starr, 2011). Public goods are nonrivalrous and nonexcludable (Samuelson, 1954), and therefore
difficult to monetize and to protect from ‘‘free riders.’’ Journalism is a public good both in an economic sense—
especially in its digital form—and in a socially desirable sense. It is not merely a commodity bought and sold
like shoes or cars; rather, it is an essential public service with social benefits that transcend its revenue stream.
In its ideal form, journalism creates tremendous positive externalities—that is, it produces benefits from the
initial market transaction that do not necessarily go to either the buyer or seller—by serving as an adversarial
watchdog over the powerful, covering crucial social issues, and providing a forum for diverse voices and
viewpoints. As a core component of civil society, journalism functions as a vital infrastructure for democratic
practice.
However, journalism—like many public goods—has never been fully supported by simple market
transactions; it has always been subsidized. For over 125 years, this subsidy primarily has taken the form of
advertising revenues. But that revenue model is becoming increasingly unsustainable as audiences and
advertisers migrate to the Internet, where ads sell for a mere fraction of what advertisers pay for paper based
products. As an approach to supporting journalism, this model appears to be irreparably broken, and no other
commercial models, such as pay wall subscriptions, come close to replacing it. The inadequacy of commercial
support brings us to the next step in this formulation: Recognizing that the market’s systematic underproduction
of the public good that is journalism qualifies as a clear case of market failure.
Mark Cooper (2011), one of the few analysts who have seriously considered market failure in the context
of the journalism crisis, presents what he describes as a ‘‘traditional framework . . . more familiar to policy
makers’’ that encourages a ‘‘new direction of policy that is necessary to ensure a robust journalistic sector’’ (p.
321). Addressing such market failure with public subsidies arguably is not actually a ‘‘new direction’’ for
American media policy—as the implementation of a public broadcast system at least suggests—but this policy
framework has largely receded from contemporary discourse. Cooper provides some analytical tools with which
to recuperate this understanding. He describes the five kinds of market Failure—societal failures, structural
flaws, endemic problems, transaction costs, behavioral problems—and their implications for journalism. Cooper
notes that McChesney and Nichols (2010) have amply demonstrated how the first two kinds of market failure
clearly afflict journalism: societal failures in the form of insufficient support for public goods and positive
externalities, as well as structural flaws in the form of monopolistic concentration and profit maximization, abuse
of market power, and the resulting degradation in the quality of journalism. Adding empirical data to reinforce
McChesney and Nichols’ analysis, Cooper extends the critique to also argue that the other three forms of market
failure affect journalism as well: The journalism crisis features endemic problems (conflicts of interest and
perverse incentives), transaction costs (the high costs of physical distribution), and behavioral problems (the
misperception of the value of civic discourse).

The key point here, however, is that when market failure is detected, the historical and logical response
has been to address it via public policy intervention. These actions have ranged from antitrust measures to public
subsidies to more content oriented policies like the Fairness Doctrine, which mandated that broadcasters cover
controversial issues important to local communities from opposing views in a balanced manner. Failure to act in
the face of market failure, we could argue, amounts to ‘‘policy failure,’’ especially from a public interest
perspective. How a society responds to market failure—in this case, specifically to a media-related crisis—often
depends on how the policy problem is framed within a particular narrative.
The role of narrative in media policy

Narratives play an important role in orienting media policy. They articulate democratic objectives, worthy
beneficiaries, and threats to freedom. They identify the most efficient means to desired ends. They also tend to
be reiterated through policy discourse as a shorthand explanatory device, particularly in media coverage meant
for public consumption (Verhulst & Price, 2008). Within media policy discourse, the thrust of these narratives
can dictate whether and to what degree government intervenes in media markets via public policy. Once such
narratives become broadly accepted, they often go unchallenged. Status quo assumptions thereby become
commonsensical; questioning them increasingly falls beyond the parameters of acceptable discourse. Narratives,
in other words, keep ideologies intact. While previous work has attempted to make sense of cultural narratives
within the historiography of media policy (Vos, 2010), little research has focused on the role of narrative within
media policy discourse.
Kunzler (2012) moves in this direction by elevating the role of ‘‘ideas’’ to a unit of analysis, arguing
that the ‘‘force-of-ideas’’ approach to explaining media policy brings into focus normative underpinnings and
policy paradigms. Kunzler’s theorization helps explain by what process an issue becomes viewed as a policy
problem, how normative goals are defined, and how the means to attain these objectives are decided. If we
understand narratives as constructed of strategically interrelated ideas, Kunzler’s formulation is very useful.
However, my analysis of power relationships somewhat diverges from his framework in that I conceive ideas
within media policy discourse as partly determined by Kunzler’s two alternative approaches to explaining policy;
namely, through the prism of political interests and institutional structures.
Seen through a lens of Gramscian theories of power (1971), narratives are disproportionately dictated
by dominant interests in society—elite groups and organizations like politicians, media corporations, educational
institutions, religious bodies, and so forth—but they also can be disrupted quite suddenly by social forces from
below. Social movements, watchdog groups, and various activist and advocacy associations sometimes are
capable of disrupting dominant discourses through strategic interventions. Still, while it is overly reductive to
assume that policy outcomes always serve powerful interests, and unintended and ironic outcomes are not rare
(Horwitz, 1989), policy narratives often help solidify relationships in favor of dominant incumbent players. Yet
despite the power of incumbency, institutional inertia, and the pull of path dependency, maintaining hegemonic
control over media policy requires a tremendous amount of maintenance and is always a messy, incomplete
process. By normalizing and naturalizing power structures, narratives help provide the ‘‘glue’’ that binds these
arrangements. For example, the narrative that constructs radio spectrum as private property (Coase, 1959)
privileges individual rights, including those enjoyed by commercial broadcasters, over public rights. On the other
hand, a counternarrative that the airwaves belong to the people supports the alternative policy regime that radio
broadcasting is inherently a public medium.
Dominant narratives that succeed in orienting press coverage and other discursive constructions help
restore paradigms, persuade publics, and contain challenges. Many of these functions of narrative are evident in
postwar U.S. policy debates that saw the rise and fall of a social democratic vision of media. The outcomes of
these policy battles between media reformers and powerful industry players had a tremendous impact on the way
the American media system developed over the ensuing decades. Looking at how the conflicting policy
orientations were constructed discursively, the following sections bring into focus what was at stake and how
these positions were defined. Toward the end of the article I address contemporary implications, particularly
around the subjects of current media policy paradigms and recommendations for recovering a social democratic
reform agenda. Central to this study is the investigation of the underlying ideologies, narratives, normative
assumptions and, finally, the politics that drove the development of the American media system.
Methods and data collection

To approach this project I am utilizing historical methods, including in-depth archival research of activist
literature, memos, letters, and personal papers connected to individuals and groups that participated in 1940s
broadcast policy debates, as well as close iterative readings of the trade press, mainstream news stories, and
official industry and regulatory reports. Papers from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC, the main
media regulatory body in the United States) provided a major source of policy documents for my analysis. When
possible, I also analyzed public speeches made by leading spokespersons from industry, government, and activist
groups. Finally, I gave close attention to the personal papers of FCC Commissioner Clifford Durr, whose range
of contacts serve as a lens through which to glimpse the inner workings of a postwar media reform movement.
Beyond tracking down digital and analog copies of postwar news literature, my data gathering took
place primarily at several key collections, including the Clifford Durr papers at the Alabama state archives in
Montgomery; the James Lawrence Fly papers at Columbia University; the Dallas Smythe papers at Simon Fraser
University; and the FCC papers at the National Archives at College Park, MD. At nearly all of these collections,
I gained permission to use a digital camera, and took over 3,000 photographs. In addition to letters from members
of the public, these collections typically included backchannel communications between progressive media
reformers, as well as exchanges on strategies and tactics designed to contest discourse that emanated from
industry representatives.
In interpreting the meaning and significance of these materials, I used what can best be described as
critical discourse analysis to interrogate underlying biases to understand how power operates through texts and
ultimately how it is constructed and reproduced (Van Dijk, 1993). In so doing, I also took historical and
contextual factors into consideration as I looked for recurring themes, contradictions, and tensions. Scholars are
only now beginning to use discourse analysis to examine media policy (see, e.g., Lentz, 2011), so there are few
blueprints from which to draw, although arguably the method has been used by previous media scholars by a
different name (see, e.g., Streeter, 1983). As Howarth notes (2000), this type of analysis focuses on language but
also the conditions under which discourses are created and contested. In the 1940s, competing discourses about
the role of radio in a democratic society—and the legitimacy of government to oversee that role—were on full
display.
Competing postwar logics

At stake in the postwar 1940s were a number of core principles by which ownership and control of the U.S.
media system would be governed. Many foundational policy decisions were made during a contentious period
in the 1930s, when a commercial media system prevailed over nonprofit alternatives. Broadcasting,
policymakers decided, would be primarily privately owned and supported by advertising revenue (McChesney,
1993), and print media institutions were able to fend off regulatory challenges from the Franklin D. Roosevelt
administration (Pickard, forthcoming) and labor challenges from the Newspaper Guild (Scott, 2009). However,
remaining undefined well into the 1940s were the public interest obligations that media companies, particularly
broadcasters, owed society in return for the many privileges conferred upon them. Ultimately the United States
moved away from a more muscular regulatory regime, but this was not an inevitable outcome. How this
happened can be better understood by examining the underlying logics of two discrete policy visions that came
into conflict in the 1940s: social democracy and corporate libertarianism. There are, of course, many shades of
political thought between these positions, but for understanding the general trajectory of the U.S. media system
over the past 70 years, it is instructive to tease apart these conflicting logics and the policy narratives that advance
them.
Social democracy

The term ‘‘social democracy,’’ like the term ‘‘liberal’’ in many nations, refers to both a political party and a
political ideology (tenets of which are often shared by political parties other than Social Democrats). In this
article, I refer to social democracy with the latter meaning in mind, particularly the underlying normative
foundations and theories connected to its ideological project. As Thomas Meyer (2007) in The Theory of Social
Democracy notes:
There are two normative premises that unite all versions of social democracy. First, ‘‘libertarian
particularism,’’ grounded in the primacy of relative liberty, is rejected in favor of a universal conception
of liberty that ranks negative and positive liberty on par. Second, the identification of freedom and property

is jettisoned in favor of a universal conception of liberty that balances the liberties of all parties against a
property relationship as if they were equivalent. (p. 16)
In other words, social democracy elevates a positive liberty in which universal and collective rights—like
those pertaining to publics and audiences and communities—are at least as important as the individual freedoms
most cherished within libertarianism.
Social democracy has been more established as an ideological project and political position in advanced
democracies outside of the United States, especially Western and Northern European countries. This ideology
sees a legitimate role for an activist state that allocates resources in an egalitarian fashion, and endeavors to
nurture a strong civil society by promoting public investments in institutions like museums, libraries, and
schools. Skeptical of unregulated capitalism, social democracy sees value in a mixed economy and assumes that
crucial services should be seen as public goods that warrant subsidizing and not left entirely dependent on the
mercy of the market. With ideals ranging from strong labor unions to universal health care, this logic seeks to
strengthen the foundations for a strong public sector through investments in critical infrastructures, including
pubic media and education. A social democratic perspective assesses the value of a media system by how it
benefits society as a whole, rather than the criteria of individual freedoms, private property rights, and profit for
a relative few.
Postwar America was closer to following a social democratic trajectory in media policy than is generally
acknowledged. A nascent media reform movement consisting of educators, labor unions, civil rights activists,
and progressive intellectuals (Pickard, 2012), advocated for a number of progressive policy interventions and
experimental models, ranging from nonprofit ventures to strong public interest mandates for commercial news
organizations. Media policy debates rose to the fore, as reformers called into question the reigning laissez-faire
relationship between U.S. media, the public, and the state. Progressive policy initiatives included the Supreme
Court’s 1945 antitrust ruling against the Associated Press (Blanchard, 1987), which called for government
protection of ‘‘diverse and antagonistic voices’’ in the media; the 1946 Federal Communication Commission’s
(FCC) Blue Book, which outlined broadcasters’ public service responsibilities; the 1947 Hutchins Commission
on Freedom of the Press, which established democratic benchmarks for journalism, and finally the 1949 Fairness
Doctrine, which defined broadcasters’ basic public interest obligations (Pickard, 2008).
All of these policy initiatives were driven by an expansive view of the First Amendment. Drawing from
Berlin’s (1969) articulation of positive and negative liberties, it is noteworthy how these safeguards protected
the audience’s positive right to information as much as—if not more than—broadcasters’ and publishers’
negative rights that protected their speech and property from government intrusion. Furthermore, all of these
initiatives provided for a proactive role for government to guarantee such positive liberties. The Hutchins
Commission, particularly in their unpublished transcripts, grappled with these competing views of the First
Amendment, noting that the entire notion of freedom of the press was rendered farcical unless everyone had
access to media (Pickard, 2010b). Some Hutchins Commission participants also noted that the postwar era had
witnessed the primary locus of threats against First Amendment freedoms shift from governmental tyranny to
the private power of media corporations. Similar debates around the 1946 FCC Blue Book offer clear
articulations of conflicting policy visions: media reformers pushed for community-controlled radio and close
governmental oversight, while commercial broadcasters pushed for libertarian freedoms and self-regulation
(Pickard, 2011a). As these two discrete visions came into conflict, their competing policies were cast into stark
contrast. How these debates played out, and how their resolution would be inscribed in media policy, brings into
focus the ideology that social democratic initiatives challenged.
Corporate libertarianism

‘‘Corporate libertarianism’’ can be seen as social democracy’s mirror opposite. While also discussing this logic
in its American context, Korten (1995) employed the term to describe contemporary global neoliberal
instruments like the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund. Corporate libertarianism
extends neoliberal logic (Harvey, 2005; Pickard, 2007) to suggest an apotheosis of market fundamentalism,
combining the exaltation of absolute individual liberty with an attempt to discredit much that is public goodrelated. Further, this framework emphasizes that corporations should be increasingly empowered and
emboldened to act as political agents, thereby undermining even weak public interest safeguards and
redistributive mechanisms in U.S. society (Pickard, 2011b). The steady march of this libertarian logic has

ushered in an unprecedented elevation of corporate power, often justified by invocations of individual liberty.
Recently exemplifying this logic has been the Tea Party movement and conservative efforts to cut public sector
employees’ salaries, benefits, and labor freedoms in many states across the country. Largely ignoring widening
inequities, corporate libertarians believe that allocating tax revenues to support social services is illegitimate,
even if the wealthy are being taxed at historically low rates.
Corporate libertarianism took form in the early 20th century and crystallized during the postwar period
after a long pro-industry campaign (Fones-Wolf, 1995), aided by anticommunist hysteria that helped defeat
alternatives. It emerged in part from processes that other scholars have termed ‘‘corporate liberalism’’
(Weinstein, 1968; Streeter, 1996), a set of discourses that attempted to harmonize the contradictions between
individual liberties and the industry imperatives of capital accumulation and private property. The logic of
corporate libertarianism differs from what has been referred to as ‘‘corporatism,’’ which sees a kind of powersharing arrangement between government regulators, labor unions, and business interests (McLaughlin &
Pickard, 2005). Corporate liberalism and corporatism allow for relatively minor conflicts and reforms—even if
the core fundamental structure, often defined by oligopolistic markets, is kept intact and largely beyond the
constraints of government regulation. Corporate libertarianism largely jettisons this arrangement, allowing a
disproportionate amount of power to redound to corporate interests.
In the 1940s, this logic was illustrated by media companies’ focus on defeating all forms of public
interest regulation, often justified with rhetoric that equated corporate power and basic individual freedoms.
While the differences between social democracy and corporate libertarianism strike at core assumptions about
what kind of society we wish to inhabit, with regards to media, these ideologies help dictate what interests a
communications systems should serve, whose stories are told, who has access to media and according to what
terms. Exploring how these debates played out around media policy in the immediate postwar years brings a
number of normative assumptions into view.
The postwar argument

In postwar media policy debates, broadcasters’ antiregulation arguments rested on three themes. First, they
argued that public interest regulations like those outlined in the FCC’s Blue Book were an attempt to censor free
speech, and thus an infringement of their First Amendment rights. A second standard line of reasoning was that
educational and nonprofit broadcasting set-asides were unnecessary since the commercial system already
provided these public services. This polemic was meant to head off structural interventions that de-privatized a
portion of radio spectrum for public use. A third and final argument rested on the assumption that any kind of
regulation of radio smacked of socialism, was antibusiness, and was therefore inherently nefarious and unAmerican. By assuming that radio had been invented and driven purely by private enterprise, they argued that
any deviation from the ‘‘free market’’—a mischaracterization, because it overlooked the fact that their monopoly
rights to broadcast spectrum were antithetical to free market relationships—was a betrayal of radio’s first
principles.
The National Association of Broadcasters’ (NAB) president demonstrated this last perspective when he
informed a group of Kiwanians: ‘‘American radio today is the product of business!’’ Anticipating FCC chairman
Mark Fowler’s 1981 statement that television was nothing more than ‘‘a toaster with pictures,’’ the NAB
president insisted radio should be treated as a commodity, because ‘‘It is just as much the kind of product as the
vacuum cleaner, the washing machine, the automobile and the airplane.’’ Pegging 1935 as the time when ‘‘radio
and its advertisers really began to get together and progress began,’’ he asserted, ‘‘Many a station operator who
might have had a personal preference for poetry and the opera learned some sound lessons in selling and
merchandising under tutelage of America’s good, hard-headed businessmen, and it was the best thing that could
have happened to him’’ (quoted in Wecter, 1946). Elsewhere, calling recent regulatory attempts a ‘‘travesty,’’
he was quoted as summing up the broadcasters’ position: ‘‘We contend it is none of the Commission’s business
whether radio is commercial, too commercial, quasi-commercial or pseudo-commercial’’ (Broadcasting, 1947).
The most common trope in broadcasters’ rhetoric was the notion of ‘‘Free Radio.’’ In addition to
appearing in Broadcasting magazine, variations of this theme appeared in postwar editorials and books. For
example, NBC president Niles Trammell’s congressional testimony was published as a pamphlet titled ‘‘Radio
Must Remain Free,’’ in which he urged the Senators in attendance to give radio a ‘‘new freedom from fear, the
fear of the blight of government control’’ (Trammell, 1943, p. 6). Likewise, the NAB issued a thick book titled
Broadcasting and the Bill of Rights based on statements made during another set of congressional hearings,

particularly antiregulation arguments proposed by NAB president Justin Miller (National Association of
Broadcasters, 1947). Libertarians did not control the definition of ‘‘free radio,’’ however; like all such normative
claims, its precise meaning was contested. Progressives attempted to place their own stamp on its construction
in venues like The Journal of the National Education Association, which framed free radio as a positive liberty,
defining it as ‘‘the widest possible range of information, entertainment, and ideas’’ (1944). And, ironically, the
phrase would become something of a rallying cry for radio reform activists in subsequent decades. In the 1940s,
however, corporate libertarians captured the term along with many normative frameworks for regulating media.
The Republican presidential candidate Governor Thomas Dewey demonstrated its centrality in conservative
ideology by declaring in 1944: ‘‘I believe that the FCC should have no right of censorship, that it should not
control the content of radio programs. It should stay in the field of regulating technical facilities. And when the
FCC starts to control program content, free radio goes out the window’’ (quoted in Wecter, 1946).
For their part, newspaper publishers, particularly those eager to acquire radio stations, kept the
libertarian ‘‘Free Radio’’ motif in circulation. The Chicago Tribune publisher Colonel McCormick—who also
had an interest in the Mutual radio network—argued that the FCC’s regulatory power to review license renewals
should be discontinued so that ‘‘wave lengths will become property and be protected in the courts like any other
property’’ (Wecter, 1946). The ‘‘Free Radio’’ frame was also prominent in editorials published in Hearst-owned
newspapers, exemplified by a piece titled ‘‘The American Radio Must Be Free.’’
[The U.S. constitution] should be amended to give the American radio the same recognition it gives the
American press, and to assure it the same FREEDOM . . . . There is already a great deal of legislation
respecting control of radio . . . but none of it has served to keep the radio FREE. The inherent weakness
of such legislation . . . is that it depends for interpretation and enforcement upon bureaucratic agencies .
. . which distort the law and assume and usurp powers under it in defiance of the authority of Congress
and in contempt of the vital rights of the American people (Boston Daily Record, 1946).
Accusing the FCC of censorship and of parroting the Democratic party, the editorial quoted the Republican
National Committee chair, Congressman Carroll Reece, as saying that radio ‘‘has fallen under the rule of seven
bureaucrats setting themselves up as judges of what seventy million American radio listeners should be allowed
to listen to.’’ According to the article, this was an action ‘‘typical of the bureaucratic state where the private
citizen is pushed around with arrogant contempt and allowed to listen only to those things which document the
dogma of his masters’’ (Boston Daily Record, 1946).
Print and broadcast media representatives responded by joining forces against the threat of government
intervention. NAB president Justin Miller issued a call to arms mobilizing everyone connected to commercial
media industries to fight a common enemy, the ‘‘strong government boys’’ who were to be found among the
usual suspects: ‘‘sophomoric professors, selfish special interests, religious fanatics, power-crazed bureaucrats,
and irascible legislators.’’ These sinister conspirators had made common cause ‘‘to emasculate the media of free
communication.’’ While commercial media’s ‘‘enemies chortle with glee,’’ Miller warned, the government’s
machinations toward radio ‘‘can be done to the press, newspapers, magazines, books, and all varied forms of
printed publications’’ (Miller, 1947, 1949, quoted in Stamm, 2011, p. 148). Elsewhere, he called for a ‘‘program
of militant resistance to further encroachments of Government . . . upon radio’s freedom’’ (Broadcasting, 1946).
According to an FCC release, he ‘‘branded talk about ‘the people owning the air’ as a ‘lot of hooey and
nonsense’’’ (Federal Communications Commission, 1946).
Equating deregulated radio with the notion of freedom was more than just convenient sloganeering.
Staking out ‘‘freedom’’ in American political discourse is the ultimate prize in rhetorical warfare. For
broadcasters to frame their arguments in terms of ‘‘Free Radio’’ allowed them to lay claim to ‘‘American
freedom’’ and all that is associated with such an esteemed position. Once they commanded that mountaintop,
any counterargument could be dismissed as un-American. Indeed, although the notion of freedom is inherently
unstable and contestable—meaning different things to different people at different times (Foner, 1998)—
anything not in line with freedom in American political discourse is a priori alien, cast outside the bounds of
acceptable practice. Such discursive wrangling suggests that the struggle centered on the role of the state as much
as media. It also suggests that the struggle was for much more than just control of radio or media in general; it
was a struggle for political economic power, one that extended across many sectors of society and struck at the
core of American corporate privilege.

Much of this rhetoric originated with political and industry elites, but occasionally it also registered at
the grassroots. In the many letters of complaint to the FCC about broadcasters’ commercial excesses and the
need for more regulation was a smattering of libertarian sentiments. For example, after reading about proposed
radio regulations in the New York Times, one concerned citizen wrote to FCC Chairman Charles Denny that he
should be ‘‘classed as a meddler and if not an actual Socialist, then something closely akin to it.’’ Arguing that
Congress gave the FCC the power to censor radio programs, he wrote ‘‘Perhaps the radio programs and the
advertising plugs are moronic, but if that is what the people of the country want, why punish the radio stations
and networks? Just remember that you were not selected to public office. You are there by sufferance’’
(McClelland, 1946). After hearing the progressive FCC Commissioner Clifford Durr debate policy on the radio,
another listener wrote: ‘‘It is appropriate that I find time on Independence Day to tell you how contemptible your
[position] was. Would that there were a freedom bath into which men of your alien mind could be immersed to
come out clean and American’’ (Luehr, 1946).
One listener saw the FCC’s regulatory position resting on five presuppositions: ‘‘the law setting up the
FCC was wise and good’’; ‘‘the interpretation of the law by the FCC is wise and good and necessary’’; ‘‘the
public is not wise and ‘Papa’ [or] a bureau knows best’’; ‘‘the public is not vocal, hence [it] must have a voice
[expressed by] that of a bureau’’; and ‘‘private enterprise cannot be trusted.’’ The listener concluded: ‘‘This
attitude, low and bitter to free American citizens, stirs me to an indignation and sadness I cannot express.’’ He
asked, ‘‘How do you know the public needs uplifting by radio? How do you know what percentage of time
should be devoted to this or that, or at what time of day certain types of programs should be put on?’’ Suggesting
that initiatives like the Blue Book was a waste of taxpayers’ money, the listener concluded: ‘‘This attitude is
paternalism, it is not trust in the ‘common man’’’ (McGinnis, 1946).
Commissioner Durr did his best to counter these arguments through opinion pieces in the media, public
speeches, and constant promotion of the FCC’s Blue Book, as grassroots groups rallied support for a more
aggressive regulatory approach to radio. On the basis of the archival materials that I consulted, the vast majority
of published opinions and public letters to the FCC were in favor of more regulation. This observation has been
supported by some previous historical work, especially Fones-Wolf (2006). Brinson (2004, p. 130) notes that
the great majority of letters to the FCC during the debates around what would later be known as the Fairness
Doctrine were decidedly against deregulation; instead, they advocated for maintaining the strict Mayflower Rule,
which forbade broadcasters’ political editorializing.
Indeed, distrust toward commercial control of media was pronounced in the 1940s, particularly among
social movement groups, educators, religious organizations, and intellectuals (Pickard, 2012). One
representative letter to Clifford Durr that exemplified support for more regulation of commercial radio began,
‘‘Three cheers and a slap on the back for a man after my own heart.’’ Thanking Durr for reserving FM channels
for ex-servicemen, the listener felt ‘‘quite certain’’ that he spoke ‘‘for many millions of my equally annoyed but
less articulate fellow citizens.’’ ‘‘Although one man against Proctor and Gamble is pretty poor odds,’’ the listener
acknowledged, ‘‘make it a good fight for a higher intellectual level of radio broadcasting, and we’re with you
one hundred percent’’ (Bingel, 1946). Another radio listener expressed skepticism about liberating radio from
advertisers: ‘‘Here we have a three-hundred million dollar industry with its high pressure lobbyists in every form
in constant descent upon members of Congress as well as your commission on one side, and the public like
myself on the other side.’’ Given these circumstances, the listener wondered ‘‘Just what can we do to halt
[commercial control of radio], which should have belonged to the people?’’ (Nelson, 1946). Ultimately, it would
prove to be a moot question, as corporate libertarianism crystallized to become the dominant policy paradigm,
allowing commercial interests to consolidate their control over the still-new medium of radio and much of the
American media system.
Recovering a social democratic media policy program

Even a casual glance will suggest that arguments against state intervention are as operative today as they were
in the 1940s. Indeed, while these views were not treated as axiomatic in the 1940s, today they seem unassailable
in mainstream policy discourse. As an article of faith, the notion that government should never intervene in
media markets often requires no explanation. This view reigns despite incontrovertible evidence of market
failure, ranging from a plummeting global ranking of American Internet (in terms of penetration, speed, and
costs) to the ongoing collapse of commercial journalism. A social democratic orientation holds that it is the
state’s duty to shield vital infrastructures and social services—including news media—from unmitigated market

logic. But historical developments in the United States have kept media policy on a different path. Bolstered by
the regulatory state’s retreat and corporate power’s ascendance, this trajectory has been sustained by the capture
of key institutions like regulatory agencies and courts, as well as decades-long public relations campaigns,
AstroTurf groups, and corporate-funded think tanks. Taken together, this confluence has erased and obscured
from popular discourse a more nuanced understanding of the social contract between corporations, government,
and various publics.
Corporate libertarianism’s increasing political clout in recent decades has had a profound impact on
U.S. society. This is particularly true in the wake of the 2010 Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. FEC,
which stands to remake the political landscape along corporate libertarian lines by unleashing nearly unlimited
funding from outside groups into political campaigns. This ascendance imperils core pillars of civil society—
groups and institutions that might contest market fundamentalism—ranging from labor unions to libraries to
community colleges. Drawing from the renowned economist John Kenneth Galbraith’s (1952) notion that
lessening the influence of concentrated power requires civil society institutions to serve as a ‘‘countervailing
power,’’ we should view journalistic institutions as an important component of this complex. But as long as
news media are seen as business commodities shielded from regulation by negative liberties usually reserved for
individuals, little recourse exists to create a viable public media system. If the history of postwar radio offers us
any insights into the current journalism crisis, it reminds us that allowing major news media to be governed
almost entirely by unregulated market forces can set a hazardous trajectory.
However, a change in course is possible. Media’s systemic vulnerabilities become most clear during
times of crisis when endemic tensions give way to overt market failure. These moments often witness brief
openings within elite policy discourse for considering radical structural alternatives. Thus the current journalism
crisis serves as a rare opportunity for strategic government intervention to lessen profit pressures on news media
that could help actualize a more robust and democratic system. Such reform, however, first requires a critical
reframing of the journalism debate. The first step in this reframing process is to debunk the standard libertarian
case against progressive media regulation. Central to this project is Ed Baker’s (2007) observation that two
arguments have long been used to discredit government attempts to cultivate a vibrant media system: first, that
the government has no legitimate role in markets, and second, that the First Amendment forbids government
intervention in media markets specifically. Both of these arguments were deployed successfully in postwar
policy debates, a time when many normative assumptions about the role of media in a democratic society
crystallized. Corporate elites assumed a libertarian relationship between media and the audience, one that owed
society little beyond entertainment. Even as the notion of social responsibility gained acceptance among media
owners, it was largely defined by self-regulation and a First Amendment constrained by negative liberties.
These ideological assumptions continue to permeate U.S. policy discourse. This is true even of relatively
liberal (in the U.S. political sense; not the economic sense) initiatives like the Federal Communications
Commission’s 2011 report on the future of media, which offered a highly critical assessment of American news
media, but—perhaps fearful of its own logical conclusions—saw only a minor role for public policy in
addressing the journalism crisis (Waldman, 2011a). Shortly after the report came out, its author suggested to a
group of public advocates that a more definitive governmental role was inappropriate because the government
should not be in a position to choose winners and because the First Amendment forbade it (Waldman, 2011b).
Such arguments not only prove Ed Baker’s point—and demonstrate the degree to which corporate libertarian
logic has been internalized even by American liberal policymakers—but are demonstrably false. The government
is always involved in markets, though often benefitting corporate interests.
American history shows that media oligopolies have not always been sanctioned; a long record exists
of public policies aimed at curbing market excesses in communication systems. Furthermore, a proscription on
government intervention in media stands on a highly dubious reading of First Amendment freedoms. If we are
to take seriously important legal precedents, government intervention can be seen as mandated to ensure that a
vibrant press system is structurally sound and protected. Indeed, there is a rich history of the U.S. government
weighing in to ensure media systems serve public needs, as the historian Richard John’s (1995) work on the U.S.
Postal Service amply demonstrates. In recent decades, elite policy discourse seemingly has been hermetically
sealed off from such ideas, but the current moment of crisis has created a potential opening to recover these lost
understandings and to challenge oft-repeated mythologies about the illegitimacy of media policy interventions
(Pickard, 2011c).

Conclusion

In the postwar era, social democratic media policy initiatives sought to address market failure. However, during
the mid-to-late 1940s these attempted reforms were overwhelmed by a corporate libertarian logic, which
continues to define the parameters of much American media policy discourse. Refuting this logic is the first step
toward recovering a social democratic policy orientation that is better suited to address worsening media
problems, particularly the contemporary journalism crisis. Today, even modest policy changes could lessen the
effects of market failure and bolster news organizations. While addressing market failure in the digital realm
(Meinrath, Losey, & Pickard, 2011) could hold many indirect benefits for news media, a number of policy
reforms aimed specifically at journalistic institutions are also viable. For example, tweaking tax laws could
eliminate barriers to innovative nonprofit ventures and help struggling news outlets transition to new business
models. And significantly strengthening American public media would be a strong first step toward funding an
alternative media infrastructure insulated from those commercial pressures that directly contributed to today’s
journalism crisis. Right now, the United States is an outlier among advanced democracies for how little it funds
its public broadcasting (Benson & Powers, 2011).
The case for press subsidies stems from the social democratic assumption that a healthy communication
system should not be overly dependent on market relationships. Therefore, according to this logic, commercial
pressures, and profit motives should be minimized or entirely removed from large sectors of the news media,
especially in the wake of what Mark Cooper (2011) calls ‘‘pervasive market failure.’’ This reframing of the
journalism crisis allows for both commercial and noncommercial models—a structurally diverse media
system—that restores balance between profit-making and democratic imperatives and is better able to withstand
market fluctuations. Also important is the hope that once a society acknowledges it is facing market failure, the
need for government action via public policy becomes more acceptable.
To be sure, economic structures do not determine all aspects of a media system. Even a well-funded
independent press will be affected by different journalistic cultures and audience interests. Moreover, in
contemporary times it is increasingly difficult to articulate a notion of ‘‘the public’’ or ‘‘public interest.’’ Such
categories must always be grounded in a conception of diverse and multiple publics, and they must always
negotiate the charge, leveled in the 1940s as now, of being paternalistic. Nonetheless, by enabling alternative
media structures, especially nonprofit models, enlightened policies can encourage new journalistic cultures and
dynamic relationships with diverse audiences. Elements of a mixed model—a hallmark of social democracy—
could be drawn from various public media institutions employed by other democracies. Already-existing
community institutions in the United States like cooperative news organizations and nonprofit media could serve
as building blocks for an alternative media system. However, these models will require some form of public
subsidy based on a social democratic understanding that the market alone will not support the communication
requirements of a democratic society. Given American media’s tendency toward excessive commercialism and
oligopoly control, it stands as a poignant reminder of what may happen when a key informational infrastructure
is left largely to market governance.
Ideological reactions notwithstanding, it is government that can best alleviate various forms of market
failure, particularly the inability to support public services ranging from education and health care to public
media and the arts. As evidence of market failure accumulates, public policy interventions remain the only viable
approach to a media system no longer supported by market mechanisms. Calling for such state support, however,
is still treated as a dangerous argument beyond the bounds of acceptable political discourse. Yet given that
government, in its ideal form, is a collective response to social problems, the main purpose for creating such a
centralized authority is arguably to provide for public goods.
The late historian Tony Judt (2010) noted that a normative foundation for a more social democratic
society begins with determining whether a policy is good or just instead of profitable or efficient. With the
discursive shift toward the latter, Judt became resigned to see contemporary times as forever disproving that
there exists an inexorable march toward a more progressive future. He suggested that many current struggles in
Western democracies must focus on merely retaining the victories of previous reformers, preventing policies
from worsening, and harboring a vision of a better society for some distant and more opportune moment. While
Judt’s observations may be largely correct at present, we need not take such a bleak view. Policy discourse is
not set in stone; it is fluid and subject to interventions from below—and it can change suddenly and dramatically.
In recent times, the Occupy Wall Street movement catalyzed just such a profound shift in policy narrative,
pivoting the national conversation from a fixation on debt, austerity, and deregulation to instead focus on social

democratic concerns about jobs and inequality. Despite many rise-and-falls and false starts for progressive media
reform, history provides grounds for guarded optimism. In media policy debates during the 1940s, one can
glimpse the emergence of a largely forgotten social democratic tradition. Although it often received public
support, this impulse was countered by a largely elite-driven rhetoric that equated ‘‘freedom’’ with deregulation.
Different outcomes may have added additional contours to the American media system, including more
educational and independent news outlets. The current journalism crisis may create another rare opportunity to
jettison flawed commercial news models in favor of democratic alternatives. Toward those ends, we can look to
international models employed in other democracies as well as those that were attempted or considered within
American historical traditions. These models were designed to compensate for the market’s failure to support
the communication needs of a democratic society.
In the United States, tensions between social and economic imperatives in media policies remain
unresolved. In the 1940s, policymakers tried but failed to remove media from direct market control and to build
safeguards to protect a more public interest-oriented system. Had these reformers not been defeated by industry
groups, and had the United States then followed a social democratic course, perhaps American media would not
again face many of the same challenges today. But despite such path dependencies, these past ideological
struggles remind us that profound paradigm shifts are not inconceivable. They merely require the political will.
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